There were also very real differencesin how the function of these organizations was perceived by governmentsas compared to Aboriginal perceptions of what their own organizations wereabout.  Government bureaucracies were only too happy to devolve theirblatantly unsuccessful attempts at Native programming to what they sawas little brown urban bureaucrats.  The Native leadership, on theother hand, saw an opportunity to use government money to organize theircommunities to press their case for Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

In addition to basic core funding, thegovernment provided or was pressured into providing what were describedas "program dollars" for specific initiatives related primarily to breadand butter issues like housing, education, and job opportunities. Some of this money was legitimately dedicated to "leadership training"and to developing a cadre of "community development officers" whose formaljob it was to introduce the various programs to the communities in eachaffiliate jurisdiction.  In fact, they often doubled as recruitersfor their respective organizations. 

The leadership of the day was quickto use these programs to attract members to their affiliate organizations. Intentionally or otherwise, access to these programs and membership inthe organizations that were delivering them were married in people’s mindsvery early in the process. Although technically such membership was notrequired by governments for an individual Native person to access theseprograms, many people today still mistakenly think membership is a prerequisiteto program access, and many organizations ? and government project officers-- encourage that misconception.

Raisingthe Stakes

No sooner had the fledgling organizationssettled into their role of increasing social and economic equity for theirrespective constituencies, when a new set of forces in the mid to lateseventies changed the name of the game from "Go Fish" to very "High StakesPoker."  The first of these factors was the increasing importanceof Native claims ? particularly north of 60 and in areas like British Columbiawhere very few treaties had been signed.  The second was an increasinglyhigh priority assigned by the Trudeau government to the patriation of theCanadian Constitution.

In 1977 the Federal government agreed,in the wake of the N’ishga Supreme Court decision, to fund a two-year claimsresearch process so that the potential claims of Aboriginal peoples inCanada could be identified. From a government point of view, and at theinsistence of national Aboriginal organizations, it was both convenientand efficient that the AROP organizations be the focus of that funding.

It was at this point that I enteredthe Aboriginal movement as a full-time assistant research director forthat project with the Ontario Métis and Non-Status Indian Association(OMNSIA).  For the next two years the NCC and each of its affiliatesraided the archives of their respective jurisdictions in the hopes of providing"proof" for their respective claims.

In a single stroke these organizationsgraduated from program delivery agents to Aboriginal rights activists. The often covert agenda of the Native leadership in terms of AboriginalTitle, Aboriginal rights and Treaty rights were not only legitimized ?it was also funded.  The project was a full-blown success on everylevel but one.  Archival proof of Indian and Métis claims wasliterally overwhelming and often far beyond even the most radical "rhetoric"of the sixties.  The stigma of being little brown bureaucrats wasfinally shed in favour of being perceived as fighters for Aboriginal rights. The organizations took on a new image in the eyes of their own people. The only failure in the process was in the government response to the finalresults of this two years of work.  (See the OMNSIA report I wroteat the time.)

Operating largely on advice from theJustice Department and its rising young minister, Jean Chretien, the federalgovernment took a narrow legalistic approach in its response in 1979. The government decided there were no valid claims inside areas coveredby treaties, and that Maritime claims (where no land surrender treatiesexisted) were "superceded by law."  That left only parts of B.C. andnorth of 60 as areas where claims might exist -- from a federal point ofview.    Although subsequent events in the next decade wereto force federal policy to back down from this decision, it was, at thetime, a crushing blow to the participating Aboriginal organizations.

Just as it seemed the Aboriginal handhad been played out, the game changed from straight poker to aces and deuceswild and the Aboriginal organizations had a mit full of deuces and morethan a few aces.  Trudeau had launched an all-out campaign to patriatethe constitution and it soon became evident he could not do it easily withoutthe support of Aboriginal people in Canada.  From a government perspective,that meant the support of national Aboriginal organizations ? includingthe Métis of the NCC.

Those organizations were sending full-dressdelegations to the British Parliament to plead their case amid the beatingof drums, the call of the fiddle, and the flash of dancing feet. The British press gobbled it up and parliamentary back-benchers had a fieldday trumpeting the Canadian Native cause.  When Trudeau was warnedthat without accommodation of Aboriginal peoples in the constitution text,quick patriation was beginning to look iffy, he ordered Justice MinisterJean Chretien to make a deal with the negotiating team of national aboriginalleaders.  That deal included the recognition and affirmation of the(undefined) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canadaand the identification (at the insistence of President Harry Daniels ofthe NCC) of Indian, Inuit and Métis (also undefined) as being amongthe Aboriginal peoples of Canada. 

The intention of the NCC in terms ofto whom the constitutionally entrenched term "Métis" was meant toapply is dealt within another part of this site [link this] and in theRCAP Final Report. The result (and a whole other article) ultimately becameSection 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 with a constitutional commitmentto hold a First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal Matters within a yearof patriation. 

Again, with the single stroke of a pen,the Aboriginal leadership of the national Aboriginal Representative Organizationsin Canada were vaulted from Aboriginal rights activists to diplomats andpolitical statesmen and women for their respective peoples.  The pokertable had been transformed into a negotiation table set for establishinga new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.