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R. v. Powley Between Her Majesty the Queen,
and
Steve Powley and Roddy Charles Powley,
[2000] O.J. No. 99
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Counsel:
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[# 1] This is an appeal pursuant to s. 116 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 ["Provincial Offences Act"] from a dismissal of charges against the respondents on December 21, 1998. The respondents were charged with offences under ss. 46 and 47(1) of the Game and Fish Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. G.1 ["Act"]: unlawfully hunt moose and unlawfully possess game, to wit: a bull moose or parts thereof, hunted in contravention of the Act. The learned judge, dismissed the charges on the ground that the respondents have an aboriginal right to hunt as Métis which is protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 ["Constitution Act"] and that ss. 46 and 47(1) of the Act were unjustifiable infringements of that right. [# 2] The offences took place at approximately 9:00 a.m. on October 22nd, 1993 when Steve Powley and his son, Roddy Charles Powley killed a bull moose near Old Goulais Bay Road near the City of Sault Ste. Marie. The Powleys did not, at that time, possess valid Ontario outdoor cards or valid licences to hunt moose. Steve and Roddy Powley both admit that they hunted moose without a licence and that they knowingly possessed game (a bull moose). [# 3] Section 121 of the Provincial Offences Act, set s out the powers of this court on an appeal from an acquittal: S. 121: Where an appeal is from an acquittal, the court may by order,(i) order a new trial; or
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[# 95] For all of these reasons, I
would dismiss the appellant's appeal, varying only as stated, the trial
judge's definition of Métis for the purposes of identifying and
affirming site-specific aboriginal rights. Although, in accordance
with s. 125 of the Provincial Offences Act, supra, this court "may make
any order, in addition, that justice requires", while I have expressed
my view as to the need, and requirement for, negotiations, given my disposition
of the within appeal, it is not necessary that an order to this effect
be made in this case.
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